In the current study it was assumed that participants of the act of communication do not always follow the rules of cooperation, and sometimes build their utt erance in a way that misleads the listener. It depends on the communicative competence of the listener and the message sender if an interaction between them takes place. Th e aim of this research was to assess to what extent deliberate, incorrect identifi cation and the mode of communication in which the text is presented makes the audience lose their orientation in both bona-fi de (informative) and non-bona-fi de (playful) mode formulations. In order to answer these questions, two experiments were conducted using three types of texts: informative text with a humorous digression, humorous informative text, and a real life parody joke. Th e information preceding the presentation of the texts and the order in which they were shown was manipulated. Respondents assessed how funny each of the texts was. 85 high secondary school students participated in the survey. Th e conducted statistical analyses enabled us to establish that the information appearing at the beginning, i.e. the type of message (informative/humorous), can aff ect the recipient's reaction and assessment of how funny a particular text was. Th e research results indicate that poor intensity of comicality in the messages may be aggravated by not indicating that they were intended to induce a humorous eff ect. Th is reveals the specifi c nature of humorous messages, bringing about an eff ect that is categorically inconsistent with the stimulus that precedes it.
Etymologically, the meaning of the term 'to communicate' is derived from the latin word 'communicare', which means 'to be in relation (connection) with', 'to participate in', or 'to form a union'.
Th ere are almost as many defi nitions of communication as there are authors addressing this subject matt er. Communication is understood as : transmission, process, speech, understanding, symbol, channel, connection, infl uence, or exchange (Goban-Klas, 2009; Morreale, Spitzberg, & Barge, 2011) . Fiske (2003) groups the theories of communication into those that concentrate on the process of communication and into those that draw att ention to the generation of communication. In an analysis of diff erent defi nitions of communication, DobekOstrowska (2011) points out that they do not oppose each other, but emphasize diff erent elements. According to Morreale, Spitzberg, & Barge (2011) , we can diff erentiate four models of communication, understood as transfer of information, agreement on a meaning, persuasion, or forming a community.
Th ese authors observe that one model is not suffi cient to explain the process of communication, as some situations in social life require an agreement on the meaning of a message while others show an ambiguity of the communicated information, for example when the aim of communication is to persuade. Th e model which combines these notions is the model of community, according to which our means of communication infl uence the quality of our life, relationships, and communities. It requires an adequate choice of the form of communication, which is possible if we possess communicative competence. Th is model can therefore be defi ned as the model of communicative competence. Communicative competence implies the use of verbal/nonverbal behaviour in order to achieve the chosen aims by a means adapted to the context. Th ere are three standards of communicative competence: clarity, appropriateness, and eff ectiveness. Clarity means the comprehensibility and explicitness of the content, although even precise messages do not always meets with understanding. Sometimes, even if the content was understood by the sender, the recipient does not agree to ascribe the relevant meaning to it. Furthermore, clarity is sometimes a means to achieve another aim. Th e aim is rarely limited exclusively to the understanding of the message content.
Appropriateness means to communicate in a manner adequate to the given context, without violating norm based rules. When a rule is broken, sanctions follow in the form of the return information. Eff ectiveness describes the degree to which the communication succeeds in achieving the expected result. Th e effectiveness of communication is closely related to the notion of purpose.
Th e authors of this model emphasize that communicative competence consists of a subtle balance between the pursuit of appropriateness and eff ectiveness. Th is means that persons with communicative competence are not exclusively set on achieving a result when imparting information or exerting an infl uence on the recipient, but also strive at the same time to observe the rules that govern interpersonal relationships.
Th is view is similar to the division proposed by Halliday (1994) , who distinguishes two functions of the use of language: ideational and interpersonal. We employ language to describe events, to communicate ideas, and to inform others about our experience and inner feelings. We also use language in order to build positive interpersonal relationships and to infl uence others. Brown and Yule (1983;  aft er: Partington, 2006 ) make another, identical distinction by diff erentiating two categories of the use of language. Th e fi rst -transaction -concerns the eff ective communication of contents, whereas the purpose of the second -interaction -is to express and maintain social relations. Partington (2006) perceives a similarity with the division proposed by Raskin (Raskin, 1985) into a bona fi de mode of communication, the purpose of which is to impart true information, and a non-bona fi de mode of communication. Th e bona fi de mode of communication is governed by the rules suggested by Grice (1980) . According to him, speech is a deliberate rational action governed by the Principle of Cooperation and its maxims, which are treated as a quasi-contract. Th is consists of the defi nition of a direct common aim and in treating the conversational interests of the other party as one's own. Grice is aware that this aim is secondary, but its consideration conditions the proper progress of the conversation. While pursuing their own, primary aims the participants of a conversation must not forget that the other party also has aims, and granting it the right to realize them while retaining their own is the basis for the proper course of conversation. In addition, there is a need for a mutual connection, an interdependence of the contributions of individual participants. Conversation is a mutual exchange. Th e burden of conversation cannot therefore rest on only one of the parties. It is necessary to build on what was said and to continue the utt erance so that the other participant can take over the burden of conversation. Th is procedure is continued until both parties acknowledge that further cooperation is unnecessary.
Th e non-bona fi de mode of communication, which includes the telling of jokes, serves other purposes, such as to amuse others or to create a friendly atmosphere, and does not require speaking the truth. Th e use of this form of communication to the above purpose relies on humour competence (Raskin, 1985) . Raskin (1985) defi nes it as a universal human quality and regards the diff erences between people in their sense of humour as mostly quantitative in character.
Communicative competence versus joke competence and humour competence
Th e above considerations lead to the diff erentiation of two modes of communication, of which one is governed by the rules of Grice (1980) and the other is defi ned by the rules of Raskin (1985) . Th e use of the non-bona fi de mode of communication requires communicative competences composed of joke competence and humour competence (Carrell, 2000) . It is necessary to possess joke competence (of a humorous text) in order to categorize the text as humorous. Th is is, however, not equivalent with a high assessment of its funniness. Th e recipient may fi nd the joke funny in a certain situation but not in another, although this does not mean that they did not recognize it as a joke. Th ey then probably treat it as devoid of humorous qualities. Carrell (2000) thinks that joke competence is a relatively static, elementary construct. Of a diff erent nature is humour competence, which Carrell defi nes as a dynamic construct formed by individual, random events, oft en determined by the situation in which the joke is told. Both constructs make up the communicative competence, which is used unconsciously. Th e recipient only sometimes, when the text is untypical, consciously initiates the process of identifying the text as a joke by asking if they are dealing with a joke. If the answer is yes, then the text is accepted as being of a potentially humorous character. If the text is not categorized as a joke then humorous treatment of it will be impossible. Th e text will be processed in the bona fi de mode or as not suited to the ongoing discourse.
We can distinguish two main reasons why a joke may not be recognized as a joke. One is lack of practice, due to which the recipient does not recognize the joke. Th e other is the lack of available scripts, which makes the understanding of the text impossible. If the recipient succeeds in recognizing the text as joke, then they will directly pass from processing it in the bona fi de mode to processing it in the non-bona fi de mode. Th ere may, of course, also be situations in which the intention of the sender was not to make a humorous utt erance but was nevertheless identifi ed as one by the recipient. Th e sender can then try to correct this interpretation, although it is usually too late for that. Humorous competence activated in the non-bona fi de mode depends mainly on the availability of scripts based on which the joke was classifi ed in the bona fi de mode, i.e. according to joke competence as a humorous text (joke). Th e activation of humour competence can have three basic results. Th e joke can be funny and therefore amuses the recipient. It is also possible that the joke is funny and the recipient does not fully recognize the scripts, but is inclined to search for the comicality in the joke. Th ey would then ask for additional information and att empt once more to process the text using the available humour competence. Lastly the joke may not be funny, which means that the recipient does not recognize the scripts in the joke and does not want to make the eff ort to deploy humorous competence. Th ey may treat the joke as not very surprising because it is already known, or perhaps imply that it is too complicated and therefore not properly understood.
Problems with the non-bona fi de mode of communication
However, the sender will not always defi ne the mode of communication. Th ey will not always announce a forthcoming joke, nor will they give any nonverbal messages to indicate this intention. Th is has its positive aspects, as it allows in many situations to avoid a confrontation between the sender and the recipient. Should the discourse participants decide to conduct their conversation in the bona fi de mode, this could lead to an endless exchange of arguments and counterarguments. By immediately referring to a communication in the non-bona fi de mode, it will remain possible to withdraw from the adopted standpoint by saying that "it was just a joke". A problem arises when the intention was clearly stated, but the utt erance is nevertheless classifi ed wrongly by the recipient. Raskin (1985) distinguishes four situations which defi ne the relations between the sender and the recipient: (1) the sender intentionally makes a joke and the recipient anticipates it (2) the sender intentionally makes a joke and the recipient does not expect it, (3) the sender unintentionally makes a joke and the recipient expects it, and (4) the sender unintentionally makes a joke and the recipient does not anticipate it.
Th e fi rst situation is a case in which the sender precedes their humorous utt erance with a clear and open cue that they are going to tell a joke. Th e purpose of such an introduction is to establish the mode of communication and to pass from the bona fi de mode to the non-bona fi de mode. Th e second assumes that, in daily life, people do not always inform their recipients beforehand that they are going to tell a joke. Oft en someone tells a joke spontaneously during a conversation in reaction to present events. Th e joke is then deliberate, but not planned. Th e third situation can be observed when the sender is manipulated into a humorous situation, which is for example the case when a message is not interpreted in accordance with the intention of the sender. Only the recipient discovers the additional meanings of the scripts used in the utt erance. Th e fourth situation can arise accidentally, without the sender's intention and without the recipient anticipating it as such. Th is is characteristic of situational humour, e.g. the sender unexpectedly sticks out their tongue and the situation is in itself funny (Zajdman, 1992) , or starts laughing because they perceived another meaning in the utt erance.
Most important in the process of communication is agreement on the mode of communication between the sender and the recipient. However, sometimes one of the participants violates the transition from the bona fi de mode to the non-bona fi de mode, which may result in mutual frustration and misunderstanding. A delay occurs when the recipient realizes too late that the message was a joke, but also when the answer of the recipient comes too late. Sometimes the recipient deliberately refuses to proceed to the non-bona fi de mode. Zajdman (1992) provides a compilation of humorous acts and the eff ects resulting from the appearance of a joke or the lack of one. Examples include situations in which: the sender and the recipient use the bona fi de mode (humourless situation; the sender uses the bona fi de mode and it is in this mode that the recipient receives the communication, but then perceives a humorous element in the utt erance and begins to process the communication in the nonbona fi de mode (unintentional humour); the sender uses the bona fi de mode and deliberately adds a humorous element in order to shift the conversation into the non-bona fi de mode. Th e recipient, however, is not aware of this and continues to process the information in the bona fi de mode, which leads to a misunderstanding; the sender communicates something in the non-bona fi de mode and the recipient processes it in the same mode by interpreting the intention and the sense of the utt erance of the sender; the sender communicates a message in the non-bona fi de mode and the recipient understands the intention of the sender and is prepared to process the information in the non-bona fi de mode, but fails to see the humorous aspect; the sender uses the non-bona fi de mode and this is clear to the recipient, who is prepared to process the utt erance in this mode, but interprets the humorous sense of the sender's utt erance diff erently.
Th e situations presented by Zajdman do not comprise communications in which the sender intentionally constructs their message so that the recipient will not be sure whether to process it in the bona fi de or in the non-bona fi de mode.
He does, however, add further possible modifi cations. Th e sender may, for example, process the communication in the non-bona fi de mode, but their intention may be to "slip in" information to be processed in the bona fi de mode. Th e recipient perceives the parallelism of the message, draws the consequences, and processes the content in the non-bona fi de mode while reading the content in the bona fi de mode. Or, the sender processes the message in the non-bona fi de mode, but his intention is to "slip in" information to be processed in the bona fi de mode.
Method and objective of our research
Th e authors of this study proceed on the assumption that communication participants do not always observe the principles of cooperation and at times, in order to achieve a certain eff ect, intentionally construct their utt erances so that the recipients will be misled. Successful cooperation depends on the communication competence of both the recipient and the sender.
Th e objective of our research was to estimate to what extent an intentionally misleading indication as to the mode of communication in which a text will be presented makes the recipient lose their orientation of whether the message is formulated in the bona fi de (informative) or in the non-bona fi de (amusing) mode . To this purpose, the following research question was defi ned:
1. Is the funniness of texts bett er appreciated when their presentation is preceded by the information that humorous texts (in the non-bona fi de mode) are going to follow, or when the recipients are told that informative texts (in the bona fi de mode) will be presented?
In addition, the following question was formulated: 1. Does an announcement concerning the specifi city of the mode of communication (bona fi de/non-bona fi de) infl uence the appreciation of the funniness of texts as a function of the order of their presentation (joke, humorous presentation of information, informative text with a small dose of humour)?
In order to provide answers to the above questions, two experiments were conducted using three forms of texts:
1. An informative text with a humorous digression; 2. A humorous informative text parodying real situations; 3. A joke.
In the fi rst experiment the same texts were presented to two groups, beginning with an informative text with a humorous digression and ending with a joke. Th e members of the fi rst group were informed that they were going to see humorous texts, whereas the members of the second group were told that they were going to see informative texts. Aft er the presentation of each text both groups were asked to assess its funniness.
In the second experiment, the respondents were also divided into two groups. As before, one group was told that it would be shown humorous texts and the second that it would be shown informative texts, but the texts were presented in a diff erent order. Th e fi rst text to be presented was a joke, the second a humorous informative text, and the last an informative text with a humorous digression. Th e task of the respondents was to assess their degree of funniness.
85 pupils from a grammar school in Szczecin took part in the research. Th ey were informed of the anonymous character of the research and of the possibility to withdraw from it. Participants received a sheet in order to mark their assessment of how funny each respective text was. Th e texts were displayed on slides by means of a projector. Th is was followed by a white screen and a period of time for the respondents to make their assessments.
Analysis of the results
Th e statistical analyses showed that preceding information about the type of the text (informative/humorous) can infl uence the reaction of the recipient and the assessment of the funniness of the given text. Th e answer to the question "Is the funniness of texts bett er appreciated if their presentation was preceded by the information that humorous texts (in the non-bona fi de mode) are going to follow, or when the recipients are told that informative texts (in the bona fi de mode) will be presented?" is very complex.
In the fi rst experiment the texts were presented in the following order: informative text with a small dose of humour, humorous text containing information, and joke (variant I). Th e obtained results illustrate that assessment of the funniness of the texts was the same for humorous texts containing information and for informative texts with a small dose of humour. Th e funniness of jokes was more highly appreciated only when the recipients were fi rst informed that they were going to assess an informative text, not a humorous text.
Th e identical assessment of informative texts with a small dose of humour and of humorous texts containing information under diff erent experimental conditions is due to the low humorous value of their content. Th e recipient of such a communication cannot, even if already prepared for the reception of a humorous text and even if this text contains a certain amount of humour, ascribe a high level of funniness to it.
Puzzling, however, is why the funniness of jokes receives higher scores in a situation where there is no conformity between the anticipated type of text (informative) and the actual type of the text (joke). Th is can also be defi ned as a divergence between the disposition to process a text in the bona fi de mode and the necessity to process it in the non-bona fi de mode. Th is calls to mind an Nerhardt (1970) concerning a certain level of incongruence. In Nerhardt's experiment (1970) , a series of weights of the same size were presented to the research participants. Th e last of the weights was always heavier or lighter than the others, although it looked the same. Th e degree of amusement always increased together with increases in the diff erence of the weight. Th e situation is similar in the current study. A small diff erence with regard to the form of the message (informative message) and the degree of comicality as between the fi rst two texts does not cause the eff ect described by Nerhardt (1970) . However, a greater divergence, which we can defi ne as incongruence, appears when a recipient who was anticipating an informative message is faced with a typical humorous text.
In the second case, the anticipation aroused by the information about a subsequent humorous text is gradually wiped out by the appearance of an informative text with a small dose of humour. Th e expectation of the recipient remains unfulfi lled, which results in a virtually negative att itude. Aft er the occurrence of the joke, the initial enthusiasm is already abated and the text is more critically assessed than would be the case without previous intervention.
In the second experiment, the order in which the texts were presented was changed. First a joke had to be assessed, then a humorous text containing information, and last an informative text with a small dose of humour. No diff erence was observed in the assessment of the humorous texts containing information and the informative texts with a small dose of humour. Th ere was, however, a diff erence in the assessment of the funniness of the jokes. It turned out that jokes received a higher assessment when the respondents were informed that the text to be assessed would be humorous. Th e results are therefore diff erent than in the fi rst experiment. Th e question is why the announcement of a humorous text results in a higher assessment of the funniness of the jokes when the jokes are presented immediately aft er the announcement. Th e answer resides in the research on anticipation, which reveals that every variable facilitating the processing of information should lead to an increased appeal of the stimulus, even if it is presented once (Winkielman, Hubert, & Olszanowski, 2011) . In our case, the variable facilitating the processing, i.e. increasing the smoothness of the processing, is the information that a humorous stimulus is to be presented and assessed. If such a stimulus (joke) then really appears, its assessment will be in accordance with the anticipation caused by the conviction that it will be a funny text. If, on the other hand, the presentation of the real stimulus -a joke -is preceded by the information that the recipient will be processing and assessing an informative text, then the recipient will be set on processing the content in the bona fi de mode. Th e humorous message is either overlooked or treated as unwanted, as a diff erent content is anticipated. Th e cognitive dissonance caused by the divergence of what the respondents expect and what really appears evokes discomfort. Paraphrasing the words of Forabosco (1991) , the recipient has diffi culty with the sense of intellectual mastery aft er the reception of a joke even if he understands the joke-specifi c logic (Ziv, 1984) since he entertains the conviction that there is an additional hidden meaning. He cannot suspend the natural att itude typical for the bona fi de mode and process the meaning of the utt erance exclusively in the non-bona fi de mode.
In our research, the type of preannouncement was not refl ected in the diff erence of assessment of a humorous informative text, as the intensity of the humorous content was not high and the text contained information in accordance with the instruction. When the respondents were informed that the text was to be processed in the non-bona fi de mode they did so, but the text was not so funny that its funniness earned maximum scores. If the recipients were instructed as to the informative character of the text they found the informative content (which was contained in the text), but were also not surprised at having to assess the funniness of the text. Its humorous form could be assessed, but again the text was not so funny that it could achieve maximum scores. Th e assessment of the funniness of informative texts was the same because the informative text with a small dose of humour was not very funny. Th e average results show that the funniness of the texts was in general assessed as rather low. Th is also included the jokes that were assessed higher aft er a humorous anticipation was created in the respondents.
Th e assessment of the funniness of texts of a certain form from the fi rst and second experiment was also compared in both experimental groups with preceding information about the humorous and informative character of the texts. A diff erence was observed in the assessment of the humorous texts containing information. Th is type of text was always the second to appear, which is signifi cant for the understanding of the observed eff ects. Higher assessments of humorous texts containing information were observed in the experimental situation in which the respondents were expecting to assess an informative text and the fi rst text to appear was indeed an informative text with a small dose of humour. In accordance with earlier analyses, incongruence between the preceding information about how to process a text results in increased amusement and a higher assessment of the funniness of the relevant text.
When respondents anticipated the presentation of humorous texts, the funniness of humorous informative texts was assessed higher when jokes were presented fi rst. Th is is due to the maintained positive att itude evoked by the announcement of a humorous text and its confi rmation by the presentation of a joke.
Th e assessment of jokes also diff ered depending on the experiment. When an informative text was announced jokes received higher marks in the fi rst experiment, where the informative text came at the beginning. As explained above, in this version of the experiment the jokes benefi ted from the surprise caused by the incongruence; the respondents simply were not expecting a joke.
On the other hand, when the assessment of the texts was preceded by an announcement of their humorous character, the funniness of the jokes was assessed higher in second experiment, where the jokes were presented fi rst. Th is indicates that a positive anticipation of the reception of humorous stimuli was induced. In the fi rst experiment, this humorous anticipation was diminished aft er the assessment of the informative text and the humorous informative text. 
Conclusions
Agreement on the mode of communication between the sender and the recipient is not always clearly defi ned. Firstly, the sender does not always inform the recipient about the mode of their message, i.e. whether it will be in the bona fi de mode or in the non-bona fi de mode. Th e sender oft en assumes that their utt erance is so explicit that the recipient should not have any problems understanding it. Due to the specifi city of humorous messages, this assumption will not always fi nd confi rmation on account of the ambiguity of the humorous message. Due to this ambiguity the text may be received literally, or may result in the suspension of the "natural att itude" and the reference to joke-specifi c logic (Ziv, 1984) . Secondly, even if the character of the message is clearly stated, there may be a problem with the construction of the message in a "pure" form. Th irdly, the recipient may have trouble reading the content, because they may not understand it and may have problems receiving it in the mode determined by the sender. Fourthly, the communication process is not always based on the rules defi ned by Grice. Participants of the communication process may intentionally introduce ambiguity, as this gives them the possibility to backtrack from the presented standpoint and hide their real intentions by pretending that the message is humorous. Th e intentional introduction of ambiguity and the concealment of the mode in which a message is constructed leads to false interpretations and assessments of the value of the given text.
In our research, we att empted to understand the mechanisms that disturb the process of communication when the mode of communication is not explicitly defi ned, or when the sender intentionally misleads the recipient as to the mode in which the message will be constructed. Th e results show that low comic intensity of humorous texts can be increased by not disclosing that they are intended to evoke an amusing eff ect. Th e humorous utt erance then causes a surprise and is incongruent with the anticipation. Th is indicates the specifi c character of the humorous message, which produces an eff ect that is categorically not in accordance with the preceding stimulus. However, in order to produce such an eff ect certain conditions must be fulfi lled. Other stimuli must be between the preceding and the assessed stimulus. If the stimulus to be assessed appears immediately aft er the preceding stimulus, the eff ect does not appear and only the stimuli belonging to the same semantic category are assessed. Th ese observations coincide with the experiments conducted by Suls and Goldstein (1972) on the phenomenon of priming, namely that if we inform the recipient that a humorous text will shortly be presented then the text must appear immediately aft er this information. Th e created anticipation infl uences the relation to the immediately delivered stimulus, but is also maintained and projected onto the assessment of the following stimulus. Weakening of the comic intensity will result in the loss of the infl uence of the introductory stimulus. If the message that appears does not belong to the relevant semantic category and is not in accordance with the evoked emotional att itude, it will cause disappointment. If the target stimulus is delivered only aft erwards, it will be more critically received. According to the literature it can be assumed that the use of humorous messages requires that the stimulus is categorized as humorous (joke competence) and that it is appreciated (humour competence) (Carrell, 2000) . Presumably, the stimulus must possess at least a minimum degree of comicality in order not to cause disappointment and in order not to achieve an adverse eff ect.
In the future it would be worthwhile to investigate if the structure and the content of the joke can also alter the results.
